Humans are subject to the composite illusion: two identical top halves of a face are perceived as ''different" when they are presented with different bottom halves. This observation suggests that when building a mental representation of a face, the underlying system perceives the whole face, and has difficulty decomposing facial features. We adapted a behavioural task that measures the composite illusion to examine the perception of faces in two nonhuman species. Specifically we had spider (Ateles geoffroyi) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) perform a two-forced choice, match-to-sample task where only the top half of sample was relevant to the task. The results of Experiment 1 show that spider monkeys (N = 2) process the faces of familiar species (conspecifics and humans, but not chimpanzees, sheep, or sticks), holistically. The second experiment tested rhesus monkeys (N = 7) with the faces of humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, sheep, and sticks. Contrary to prediction, there was no evidence of a composite effect in the human (or familiar primate) condition. Instead, we present evidence of a composite illusion in the chimpanzee condition (an unfamiliar primate). Together, these experiments show that visual expertise does not predict the composite effect across the primate order.
Introduction
Humans discriminate face stimuli with remarkable speed and accuracy. It has been previously asserted that the underlying system builds mental representations of face stimuli which are holistic in nature, i.e. distinctive facial features are not processed independently, but are instead fused together into a single unit of analysis. One clear prediction that follows from this assertion is global precedence; the identity of a whole face will change the perceived identity of any isolated facial feature (e.g. the left eye). Evidence of holistic processing in humans comes from a number of behavioural experiments where the perceived identity of a facial feature was affected by the presence (or absence) of other facial features (Davidoff & Donnelly, 1990; Donnelly & Davidoff, 1999; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Ingvalson & Wenger, 2005; Mermelstein, Banks, & Prinzmetal, 1979; Sergent, 1984; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Thompson, 1980) . However, perhaps the most direct measure of holistic processing that is currently available is, what is widely known as, the composite effect (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Hole, 1994; Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Robbins & McKone, 2007; Rossion, 2008; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) .
The composite paradigm explicitly asks subjects to ignore the global identity of a face and to instead attend to a subset of facial features. In the original investigation, for example, subjects were asked to name the top half of a highly familiar face while it was presented with the bottom half taken from a different face (Young et al., 1987) . Performance was compared across two experimental conditions where the only difference was the alignment of the two halves. In the 'aligned' condition the task relevant information (the top half of the face) was presented directly above the bottom half, in a typical face format. In the 'misaligned' condition, the two halves were laterally offset (i.e. shifted along the common horizontal axis). Naming the familiar features in the top half of a composite face was found to be more difficult in the aligned condition than in the misaligned condition. The relatively poor performance associated with the aligned condition was attributed to the holistic interference generated by the inappropriate integration of the two inconsistent halves. Thus, performance recovered in misaligned condition because the features in the top half were not tightly bound to the features in the bottom half (also see Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Hole, 1994; Hole, George, & Dunsmore, 1999; Le Grand et al., 2004; McKone, 2008; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Robbins & McKone, 2007; Rossion, 2008; Young et al., 1987; Yovel, Paller, & Levy, 2005) .
